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CAN LESS BE MORE? 
MINIMAL STRUCTURING, IDENTITY AND LEARNING AROUND IT 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on how organizational structuring can facilitate or hinder organizations’ 
capacity to learn when a new technology is implemented. We are concerned with a particular 
philosophy of structuring- minimal structure. We argue that learning ultimately depends on 
the way communities build their sense of identity while enacting existing structure. 
Organizational context can facilitate or hinder the processes by which a sense of community 
is created. Formative context plays a very important part in these processes. Underlying this 
sense of community, social identity structures meanings, coordination, learning and 
improvisation are all defined relative to action contexts, not to self-contained and abstract 
structures. Identity is critical to the enactment of minimal structures. An in-depth multiple 
case study design of two telebanking systems implemented and used are described, and 
analyzed. Findings indicate that there are ways by which the structuring can block 
improvisational activity, this in turn hinders both the social identity and the social learning 
processes. Moreover, minimal structuring design philosophy gives room to improvising and 
to making sense of the incoming events and the development of ad hoc solutions, within the 
community-of-practice. Only if identity unfolds, can organizational members enact 
consensual guidelines and agreements that constitute minimal structures. Furthermore, we 
claim that the theory of organizational learning can greatly benefit from the development of a 
theory of organizational improvisation. 
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The implementation of a new technology in the work setting can establish the 
conditions that might create a resource space for new organizational structures to emerge. 
The implementation of IT should be treated as an occasion for structuring in organizations: 
“Information systems can be particularly conducive to new and sustained rounds of social 
negotiation” (Barley, 1986, p.51). 
Adler and Borys (1996) have differentiated two generic types of formalization: 
enabling and coercive. In the latter case, the organization entails an annulment of employees' 
autonomy and commitment, hence limiting innovation and learning. Employees have little 
motivation to contribute to a change in the mixes of routines or contribute to the complex 
non-routine tasks that can constitute improvisation. In the former case, formalization is 
designed to enable employees to master their tasks. These authors posit that employees' 
attitudes to formalization "depend on the attributes of the type of formalization with which 
they are confronted” (p.66) and call for the urge "to understand the distinctive features of the 
different types of rules and to understand what distinguishes how these types are formulated 
and implemented” (p.67). It is our contention that it is not enough to characterize the features 
of coercive and enabling structures, the design process or the implementation of the system. 
Instead, we need to understand how emergent structures are enacted in practice through 
recurrent interaction with the technology at hand that makes organizational members 
perceive those structures as enabling or as coercive. Until technology is used in some 
ongoing human action- and thus becomes part of a process of structuring- it is, at best, a 
potential structuring element, and at worst, a forgotten alien. Structures are only instantiated 
in practice. Orlikowski (2000) advocates that while the notion of appropriation of structures 
embodied in the technology captures well the importance of human action in shaping situated 
technology, the focus on emergent rather than embodied structures, allows us to frame what 
users do with technology not as appropriation but as enactment. Thus, this perspective starts 
with practice and examines how it enacts emergent structures through recurrent interaction 
with the technology at hand. People draw on their skills, power, knowledge, assumptions, 
and expectations about the technology and its use. Furthermore, the two extreme types of 
formalization do not allow for a trade-off between structure and flexibility/spontaneity, 
between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991), between specialization and coordination 
(Demsetz, 1988) and between innovative processes and organizational learning (Sorensen 
and Stuart, 2000). 
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MINIMAL STRUCTURES 
In organizational adaptive processes, of which the implementation of a new technology 
constitutes an example, there is a constant and pervasive need for dynamically integrate 
structure and flexibility. Several authors have noticed the potential relevance of this type of 
structure. Kamoche and Cunha (2001), building upon the jazz metaphor, introduced the 
concept of “minimal structures”. Still on the basis of jazz, Kanter (2001) referred to them as 
the “theme” that prevents improvised action from degenerating into chaos. Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997) described them as “semi-structures”. Minimal structures are a set of 
consensual guidelines and agreements, co-ordination devices that attempt to focus the 
activities of people around a common set of goals and deadlines without limiting their 
discretion to best decide how to reach these goals. Weick (1989, p.244) suggests that the value 
of a minimal structure is that “small structures such as simple melody ..., general assumptions, 
and incomplete expectations can all lead to large outcomes and effective action”. 
As structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) applied to organizations might suggest, 
communities-of-practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991) will become ubiquitous sources of 
knowledge driving change (Brown and Duguid, 2001). These communities may make use of 
an improvisational model that is change-driven, unconstrained by the imperatives of function 
or sets of activities and lays more emphasis on combining the need of structure with that of 
dynamic flexibility. This is facilitated by the minimal structure, where appropriate levels of 
responsibilities, priorities and procedures are clearly defined and combined with wide zones 
of manoeuvre (Kamoche and Cunha, 1999). The minimal structure serves as a platform upon 
which learning and improvisation can take place and allow communities-of-practice to 
develop within these zones of manoeuvre. The sense of community structures discourses, 
learning and, coordinated actions through identity. Practice creates epistemic differences 
between communities within organizations and it is inside these communities that knowledge 
is created. The improvisation is characterized by an unrelenting quest for discovery and 
innovation along the social and technical dimensions. Kamoche and Cunha (2001) see 
minimal structures as comprising of two dimensions: social structures and technical structures. 
The application of social and technical structures reverberate socio-technical systems tradition 
(STS; e.g., Emery and Trist, 1960). STS ostensibly recognizes the importance of social forces 
in work organizations. This recognition frequently creates a shift from individual to group-or 
team- methods of performance. Positive variance within the work system is viewed favorably   5
as a sign that teams are adapting to their unique environment conditions. In what follows we 
will describe each of the constitutive parts of the minimal structure and how they might help to 
develop a dynamic understanding of IT implementation. 
 
Social structures 
Social structures are conceptualized largely in terms of behavioral norms and communicative 
codes that help determine performance standards. There is an unspoken understanding of the 
need to respect and comply with these basic guidelines for action, for without them the 
improvisational process may degenerate into chaos.  
Formative, institutional or imaginative/cognitive contexts exert a major influence upon 
the form and course of social routines, yet one of the hallmarks of the formative context 
(Unger, 1987) is that it is itself hard to challenge, revise, and even identify in the midst of 
everyday cares. One important point is to consider two levels embedded in human action: the 
visible level of practices and routines and the invisible, taken for granted stock of knowledge 
within which routines are formed and from which they receive meaning. Formative context 
exercises a subtle, diffuse effect by its influence on social possibilities and collective 
identities. The context is ‘formative’ in that it shapes the ways people perceive, understand, 
make sense, perform and become organized and, also because it may help people to see and 
do things in new ways, or stick stubbornly to old ways. As Blackler pointed out, "Formative 
contexts are reproduced by the behavior of those affected by them, but this process involves a 
process of improvisation and compromise that will be poorly recognized, articulated or 
planned for" (1992, p.284).  
The formative context results from a makeshift combination of everyday practice and 
bricolage, a sedimentation of local and global arrangements, where old routines are tested, 
discarded, retrieved, collated and combined along a mainstream of sense (Ciborra and 
Lanzara, 1994). 
As we have argued, knowledge creation ultimately resides in communities-of-practice. 
Learning is implicated in the acquisition of knowledge but also in the acquisition of identity. 
"Learning processes are intrinsically social and collective phenomena" (Teece et al., 1994, 
p.15). Communities-of-practice provide the work context within which members construct 
both shared identities and the social context that helps the identities to be shared. 
In these communities learning and improvisation occur when individuals mobilize the 
network to access the community’s collective knowledge (Barley and Kunda, 2001).   6
Legitimate Peripheral Participation, or LPP (Lave, 1988) is the process by which newcomers 
become included in a community-of-practice. Most learning takes place through modified 
forms of participation that are structured to open the practice to nonmembers. Peripherality 
and legitimacy are two types of modification required to make participation possible 
(Wenger, 1998). Peripherality provides an approximation to full participation that gives 
exposure to actual practices, and in order to be on an inbound trajectory, newcomers must be 
granted enough legitimacy to be treated as potential members. Orr’s (1996) study reveals that 
those modified forms of participation proceed in such a way that they remain inseparable 
from work. “The technician was important in the process of diagnosing and storytelling, 
whose participation could legitimately grow in from the periphery as a function of his 
developing understanding. His legitimacy is an important function of the social relations 
between the different levels of service technician, which are surprisingly egalitarian, perhaps 
as a result of the incoherence of problems this sort of technology presents: a specialist cannot 
hope to exert hierarchical control over knowledge that s/he must first construct co-
operatively” (Brown and Duguid, 1991, p.12). 
To open up to practice, peripheral participation must provide access to the three 
dimensions of practice by which it becomes a source of identity for a community (Wenger, 
1998): (1) mutual engagement with other members; (2) their negotiations of the enterprise 
and, (3) the repertoire in use. These are “the small set of big rules” supported by minimal 
structures. When people receive favorable identity-relevant information from membership in 
an organization they respond behaviorally by cooperating with the organization (Tyler, 
1999). The degree of cooperation within a community is shaped by people's use of 
organizational membership to create and maintain a favorable identity. So, the key to 
understanding how to develop and maintain cooperative behavior is understanding how 
identities are created, shaped and maintained within communities. 
As Brown and Duguid (2001) have pointed out communities-of-practice are useful for 
examining organizational knowledge as well as identity for a number of reasons: (1) they are 
privileged sites for learning and knowledge creation; (2) They are important repositories for 
the development, maintenance and reproduction of knowledge; (3) The members provide for 
one another social affordances (Cook and Brown, 1999) that frame knowledge creation in 
practice; (4) Organization adaptability is to a significant degree determined by the 
communities-of-practice.   7
A minimal structuring design philosophy gives room to improvise and to make sense of 
the incoming events and the development of ad hoc solutions, within the community-of-
practice. People draw on their skills, power, knowledge, assumptions, and expectations about 
the technology and its use. This includes meanings and attachments that users inter-
subjectively associate with particular technology and its use, shaped by the formative context 
and by their experiences with various technologies and their participation in a range of social 
communities. These social communities need to have a basis, which enables identities to 
develop. The way in which this identity process unfolds will lead employees to perceive their 
structure as enabling or coercive. 
 
Technical structures 
This refers to the techno-structural and performative conventions as well as the variety and 
combination of talents, skills and capabilities members bring to the community. Badham (1994) 
proposed a configurational model of technologies in organizations. As a variant of STS, 
technologies come to be understood as part of a looser, complex and changing technical 
system, and requirements of technologies are necessarily interpreted within, and influenced 
by, the social context in which they are used (Badham, 1993). The user, like the technology 
that s/he uses, is also ‘configured’ by interpretations of internal and external forces. The 
concept of ‘technological configuration’ points to the importance of specific constellations of 
knowledge, equipment and procedures, and loosely systemic, complex and locally 
constituted character of working technological systems. The development of ITs follows an 
uncertain process of experimentation and discovery that gives rise to unanticipated outcomes. 
Mistakes can be treated as an opportunity for organizational learning (e.g. Harryson, 1997; 
Sitkin, 1992), failure resulting from risk-taking can be rewarded (e.g. Sasaki, 1991), and 
managers can accept and encourage “rule-breaking” (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Multi-skilling or versatility is a central feature of improvisation; it also plays a crucial role 
in facilitating experimentation. Cross-functional skills are required by the interdependency 
inherent in team working. For example, Adler et al. (1999) found extensive training and rotation 
accorded a very high priority to the extent that workers attained sufficient competence to rotate 
around four jobs. Coupled with extensive competence is knowledge about tools/technology 
through which this expertise is accomplished. 
Although project team-members cannot be expected to be expert in all the available 
technologies, an understanding of the available technology and how this helps to coordinate   8
collective action is essential for bringing multiple perspectives to bear on the distributed task 
(Seifert and Hutchins, 1992). 
Stored knowledge and skills shape improvisation in important ways. Knowledge of the 
productive process is helpful in creating an ability to use whatever materials/tools are at hand 
and to apply them to the task in a manner similar to the practice of bricolage (e.g., Weick, 
1993). Constant experimentation and trial-and-error have an enormous potential to achieve 
individual and organizational learning, but improvisation learning has also the potential to solve 
surprising problems and/or create value from an unexpected opportunity (Miner, Bassoff, 
Moorman, 2001). Different organizations can develop improvisation competencies in specific 
areas of activity. This prospect stresses the potential value of research on how improvisation 
may help create and sustain distinct communities-of-practice within an organization (Brown and 
Duguid, 2001). 
In this paper, we empirically explore Kamoche and Cunha’s (2001) improvisational 
model. We are particularly interested in two aspects: (1) the emergence of social structures 
within a minimal structuring philosophy, and (2) how did the combination of social and 
technical structuring features, facilitate or hinder learning. These issues were addressed 
through a contrast analysis of the implementation and use of two telebanking systems 
belonging to the same financial group. 
 
METHOD 
This research has been conducted under the broad banner of ethno-data. Ethno-data “are the 
extraction, from qualitative morass, of those data which researchers claim represent the 
native experience. It emerges from a variety of representational strategies, but is united in 
their commitment to representing empirical reality as it is experienced by organizational 
participants” (Stablein, 1996, p.515). The ethno-data approach also makes it possible to 
address the problem of inappropriately fixing meanings where these are variable and 
renegotiable in relation to their context of use. Ethno-research stresses the socially 
constructed nature of reality, the relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and 
the situational constraints that shape inquiry. The nature of the research questions tends to be 
concerned with how social experience is created and given meaning. Thus, the stress is on 
processes. There is an emphasis on the value-laden nature of inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994). As Barley as noted, “It is in the precarious balance between the controlled and the   9
uncontrolled, the cognitive and the affective, the design and the unexpected that fieldwork 
finds vitality and analytic power” (1990, p.220). 
Ethnography is an interpretation blending behavior and meaning. Interpretation is the 
consummate goal of ethnography because meaning is understood to derive from 
interpretation, where knowledge is significant only insofar as it is meaningful. Ethnography 
involves understanding the ongoing experiences of social actors in terms of their own 
subjective realities. 
The research took the form of multiple in-depth case study comparison design: in 
particular, a clustered hierarchical design for the in-depth interviews was employed. This 
design is suited to delineate core characteristics of the work practices and its major variants. 
Rather than imposing an a priori theoretical framework, we wanted to be open to what the 
sites had to say, and therefore be prepared to change direction regarding initial assumptions 
and theories, as data emerged.  
The methodological approach emphasized the rich, complex character of naturalistic 
settings and the importance of context, specificity and detail. Its relevance to work settings 
has been greatly promoted by the advocates of the practice-based approach, who signal a new 
attentiveness to the nature of working life as a context-bound social activity. The case study 
lends itself to ethnographic work, which positions validity-as-reflexive accounting (Altheide 
and Johnson, 1994). That is: “It places the researcher, the topic, and the sense-making 
process in interaction” (p.489). 
For the purposes of the present research a comparative multi-case study of the 
implementation of two telebanking systems was used, employing ethnographic techniques, 
such as observation and in-depth interviews. The understanding of micro-organizational 
processes requires a method that captures the rich detail of organizational life within a multi-
faceted context.  
During observation, we sat next to operators or technicians and accompanied them 
while they were doing their job. Observation of meetings, of training classes and especially 
of individuals at work was carried out throughout the field study. Observation mixed with 
real-time interviewing is better suited for studying work practices. Overall, ten TB related 
meetings were attended and observed. A total of over 300 hours of on-site observations took 
place. We spent two periods of two weeks observing life in each site, analyzing documents 
and memoranda, as well as interviewing key personnel. A total of 57 in-depth interviews (TB 
managers, supervisors, technicians and operators) were conducted in an effort to uncover the   10
day-to-day sense-making activities associated with the establishment of a TB. A large 
number of informal conversations took place during coffee breaks or lunchtime, and hand 
written notes were taken. 
The research sites were chosen on the strength of the quality of research analysis they 
offered. The organizations were able to offer high quality access, which as Streeck (1986) 
has pointed out, is an indispensable, but rarely granted, requirement for qualitative research. 
In addition, the company’s TB represented an ideal case study through which to explore the 
ways in which the implementation of a complex information and communication system may 
affect, and be affected by, organizational sense-making activities. 
 
The Research Sites  
FlexSite and BlackSite are two telebanking systems belonging to the same financial group. 
Therefore, we will start this section by presenting the background of FlexSite and BlackSite, 
then explaining what is a telebank and what is the technology involved.  
 
Background. PrivateBank was the result of the efforts of a group of European investors who 
were dissatisfied with the level of the banking service available in their country. PrivateBank  
was founded in June 1985. The overall strategy of PrivateBank  was set out in the form of 
four core policy decisions: 
•  it would be a new bank rather than a copy of anything that had previously existed 
in the country. 
•  it would be a universal, high quality and nation-wide bank. 
•  it would be run by a professional board independent of shareholders. 
•  it would employ the latest technology in order to deliver high quality services to 
target markets. 
The overall mission of PrivateBank was: “To become a major bank by providing 
excellent, innovative, and personalized products and services that are designed to meet all the 
financial needs and expectations of the most relevant domestic market segment.” According 
to a member of the board, “the underlying philosophy is to be a “market-driven”, people-
driven and technology-driven bank”. Operations strategy was a key to achieving overall 
objectives. Particularly relevant was the focus and process technology. 
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Focus and Technology. From the start, PrivateBank has been driven by a belief in market 
segmentation. This enabled PrivateBank to effectively plan its entry into the market and its 
subsequent development based on the attractiveness of segments and its ability to enter those 
segments. Each time it moved into a new segment it set up a new business group to manage 
it. Indeed, throughout its life PrivateBank has maintained separate teams and resources for 
separate segments. The bank recognized the importance of IT in supporting the 
implementation of its overall strategy. Its main strength is the deliberate attempt to link IT to 
its business strategy and build a competence in the business use of IT. 
Technology has played a critical role as an enabler of some critical innovations, such as 
strategic databases for prospecting and selling to clients, distributed processing with 
centralized data for the different banks of the group, comprehensive information support 
systems for account managers, sophisticated automation in branches and the flexible and 
rapid deployment of systems to support new banking products.  
 
Organizational Culture. The bulk of the information flows were informal and rapid. 
PrivateBank attached considerable importance to informal communications and motivating 
people. A clear majority of employees feel the internal orientation towards the customer and 
a strong pressure for quality, expressed by managers, is responsible for keeping high levels of 
work motivation. Several examples are shown below: 
 
“Our culture mirrors efficiency, customer orientation and keeps levels of 
individual motivation high" (FlexSite, second  line call-service manager). 
 
“I think that PrivateBank culture is working methodically and enjoying 
what one does, and enjoying being here! The values of PrivateBank are that 
everyone is working for common goals and we are doing our best to 
achieve these goals. PrivateBank is a stable group, it has highly developed 
technology, good working conditions, benefits and career progression” 
(FlexSite, First Line plus 2). 
 
PrivateBank prides itself on being a very informal institution. As one FlexSite manager 
explained: “We don’t have a real organization chart. We might draw them from time to time. 
But we never approve one. When we approve something and then you want to change it…   12
you have to take the decision to change it. Furthermore, having an approved structure would 
go against our strategic goal of remaining highly flexible. Or, flexible enough so as to ensure 
the creation of innovative products and services those meet the needs of the market. What we 
definitely do not want is to fall into the trap of bureaucracy!” 
Teamwork was highly valued within PrivateBank from the outset. A FlexSite manager 
explained that the culture of informal communication was essential to teamwork within 
PrivateBank: “whenever I have an idea or a problem, I directly contact the person who I 
think can help. If we feel it is necessary, we get a group of people together to work as a team. 
We do not have bureaucracy obstructing the formation and functioning of the teams. 
Moreover, staff rotation is a common practice so this increases our overall knowledge of the 
group. Staff rotation happens about once every three years. The advantage of these rotations 
is that they make people more flexible. You also enrich the culture by making people more 
aware of the issues and difficulties being faced elsewhere.” 
The team culture was instilled in all new employees when they entered the bank. They 
went on a three-week induction program in teams of mixed background, learning about the 
bank, the use of the bank’s systems, etc. PrivateBank culture was never formally defined, but 
elements of it are reflected in the following comments: 
 
"We are strongly loyal to the company and the group. We know from 
the start that we are working in a clear project" (FlexSite, Supervisor 
2). 
 
PrivateBank culture, being both strong and traditional, was closely associated with the 
charismatic personality and religious beliefs of the group’s president. He worked outside the 
country for a private bank and was imbued with the work ethic and professionalism of the 
bank’s guiding influence, and with strong religious beliefs. The spirit is based on the 
sanctifying value of ordinary work, this means according to their statutes: 
•  Working with the greatest possible competence and with the greatest perfection 
possible. 
•  Carrying out their work with the fullest respect for the law and in conformity 
with the demands of ethics. 
•  Working with the desire of serving one’s fellow citizens and of making a 
contribution to the progress of society.   13
 
The Design Concept. The adoption of a green field site strategy was a core design 
specification and a fundamental pre-condition for a successful implementation of the whole 
group. The rationale behind a green field site points to the need for a fresh start as a pre-
condition for implementing a new organizational model. Any new business was born from 
the green field and conceived according to the strategic guidelines endorsed by PrivateBank.  
The implications of this strategy for the management of change have been widely 
recognized in the literature. Lawler (1982) has emphasized the holistic character of design 
connected with the adoption of a green field strategy. “New organizations simply have a 
number of advantages when it comes to creating high involvement systems. They can start 
with a congruent total system; they can select people who are compatible; no one has a 
vested interest in the status quo; it is possible to do the whole organization at once.” (Lawler, 
1982, p.307). As Beaumont and Townley (1985, p.189) added, “the green field site offers the 
prospect of a tabula rasa (...) the possibility of establishing work organization, job design, 
personnel and industrial relations policies afresh rather than attempting to tackle these issues 
on an ad hoc basis in existing organizations. It provides the opportunity to experiment with 
the development of a coherent green field philosophy.” 
A green field site provides a background for learning, discovering and improvising. 
Expansion green field philosophy, once it takes on the contributions of various organizational 
actors, is a very favorable circumstance for studying the implementation of a new 
technological-based project “Green field sites are a mixture of opportunity structures and 
structural constraints” (Blau, 1990, p.145). To a certain extent, the structural features of 
green field sites allow a company to keep some processes under control. For example, the 
absence of a solid industrial tradition associated with green field sites may facilitate the 
‘indoctrination’ of the work force and the transfer of knowledge in a top-down manner. At 
the same time, the low degree of institutionalization of the initial stock of knowledge might 
create suitable conditions for the emergence of unforeseen events, which may challenge the 
original design concept. 
The design concepts of FlexSite and BlackSite, embraced many of the ideas connected 
to the choice of a green field strategy. However, their implementation presented many 
idiosyncratic aspects which possibly explain the astonishing performance of FlexSite in 
particular, and the apparent failure of BlackSite. The various contributions from different   14
organizational actors need to be traced back to the project group. We will focus on these 
idiosyncratic aspects after having presented the technology that is common to both sites. 
 
Technology involved in Telebanking Systems (TB) 
Telemediated banking services involve the integration of telecommunications and computer 
technology to provide personal financial services remotely. There are two system 
components:  
•  Telephone Customer System (TCS)- Software that gives information to the 
operator in a synthetic and organized way.  
•  Meridien Max- this includes the Automatic Call Distributor (ACD is at the 
heart of the production process in TB, that pumps incoming calls wherever 
they need to go), the Agent Windows for the supervisors and the telephonic 
platform. It allows tracking of macro-view (overall system performance) and 
micro-views (individual agent’s performance). IT provides both real-time 
statistics display and historical reporting on the callcentres performance in 
standard or customized formats on the Max PC terminal. This allows real-time 
reconfiguration of the system by the supervisor to ensure peak performance. 
The call arrives at the Meridien Max and it is routed either to a Voice 
Response Systems (VRS is concerned with automating the handling of 
customers by removing operators from the task wherever possible) or to the 
communicator who has been idle for the longest period. All automatic 
procedures are similar in FlexSite and BlackSite. 
 
In what follows we will analyze the FlexSite and BlackSite developments, how they 
configured their customers, their technology and their personnel.  
 
 
FlexSite: The effects of an enabling structure 
Implementation. FlexSite was considered a pilot site for telephone banking in the country. It 
followed the market segmentation strategy and green field design, according to the loose 
guidelines endorsed by PrivateBank group. The implementation process followed 
PrivateBank strategic guidelines were set out in the previous sections: A highly effective 
service embedded in the strong religious culture and tradition. The starting point was   15
configuring and targeting their customers. Only then could customers be expressed in a 
particular technological and organizational form and solution.  
Rather than relying on vendors who peddle pre-designed technologies, FlexSite 
stressed the need for a customer-tailored system that has been designed with the aid of the 
group’s members to address the specific nature of their work. While the organization has 
employed consultants to help design the system, the consultants' role was to focus members’ 
attention on organizational issues and the processes and practices of organizing the 
implementation of a socio-technical system. Vendors were contacted after the nature of the 
desired system had been defined. They were consulted as sources of information and 
technical expertise, but any final decision regarding the choice of the technology and its 
deployment were left to FlexSite team project members. 
The cornerstone of this approach was broad participation by those who would be 
affected by the technology. A task force composed of a cross-section of the group’s members 
was formed to assess the nature of the organization’s work, to identify potential points where 
improvements were possible and to suggest how technology might enable current problems 
to be solved. 
The implementation of FlexSite was a complicated task and a complex social structure 
where previous knowledge was demanded. A large amount of new knowledge or re-
combinations of existing knowledge were needed, so the project team was composed in a 
way that a pool of different types of knowledge could be combined. The institutionalized 
knowledge was embedded in the social relations of the internal team. All these different but 
complementary types of knowledge and experiences constituted the background for 
improvising around FlexSite construction. 
This community-of-practice was the prime context in which it was possible to work out 
common sense through mutual engagement. Thus, through their practice, the social and 
negotiated character of the various types of knowledge was highlighted. By engaging in the 
project team, different members started acquiring practical skills of negotiating meaning and 
simultaneously developed a process of constructing identity with a community-of-practice in 
the making. All team participants were able to engage with the technology, participating in 
social relations and all other activities. This internal part of the team who had full 
participation in the project went to the extent that data flows, work routines and practices but 
even cultural and social antecedents of FlexSite were embodied in the technology. The 
outcome was a transparent technology.   16
 
FlexSite in Action. Once first
 line communicators started working, the supervisor ensured the 
quality of communicators’ performance through call coaching. While it obviously has a 
strong monitoring and control element, it is also used for training purposes. Call coaching has 
two objectives: discipline and learning. In FlexSite, control is perceived as a positive, 
constructive and an unobtrusive instrument. 
Individual communicators often lack the personal and institutional resources necessary 
to respond to a given call. These communicators can draw on other resources of the 
organization by getting help or transferring the call to second
 lines. Thus, exceptions are 
handled by working inside the banking system. If, for some reason the communicator cannot 
give an immediate solution to the customer’s problems, interactions with customers are 
expected to be in accordance with specified service standards following set of ‘moves’ 
(Pentland, 1992): 
•  Try to find a solution together with the client. 
•  Look for a solution to the problem, with the help of the supervisor while the 
customer is kept on hold. 
•  Transfer the call by overflow to second lines, if the communicator knows that 
it is among second lines’ competencies. 
•  Transfer the calls to other departments or other companies of PrivateBank, 
where the experts on the subject matter are located. 
 
Staff rotation within the PrivateBank Group enriches the mutual repertoire and mutual 
understanding. It also allows for making ‘human back up’ by switching personnel between 
teams. They have de-contextualised and re-contextualised the resources in different situations 
giving room for change. The rotation also allows actors to meet more people and to know 
what they are good at, so they can draw on their knowledge or skills whenever required. This 
enables them to solve a broad scope of problems by inspiration elsewhere. This community-
of-practice became a mobile database; which is part of their support for improvising. 
FlexSite is a product of the accumulated negotiated actions and improvisation that 
occurred while developing, and new solutions were needed to face problematic situations. 
The collective construction of a local practice, among other things, makes it possible to meet 
the demands of the institution and create a stock of knowledge to draw on when required. 
Although jobs in FlexSite are primarily designed and organized individually, actors become   17
important to each other. They act as resources for each other, exchanging information, 
making sense of situations, sharing new tricks and new ideas, as well as keeping each other 
company. In the community-of-practice, they know these materials intimately. Thus, they are 
able to form the insights or materials in combinations anew when facing problematic 
situations. 
When there are system errors or other types of breakdowns in the workflow, 
communicators typically consult the supervisor or develop interim coping strategies, while 
experts are solving the problem. In FlexSite, technical breakdowns are perceived as 
happening very seldom; nevertheless internal technicians give constant support. Although in 
the interviews only managers and helpdesk technicians could recall a few breakdowns, 
during observation the researchers were able to observe several small ones. When confronted 
with this contradictory information a second line communicator opined: “Breakdowns here 
mean that we cannot make any sense of what is happening and we have to stop working. The 
small ones, that you have observed, are pervasive, everyday phenomena that we are able to 
solve and to harness thanks to…I have no idea! It seems that we absorb them because there is 
some recurrence.” 
FlexSite has absorbed breakdowns through the incorporation into some kind of 
problem solving routines. Nelson and Winter (1982, p.129) provide a similar example: 
“Consider the foreman of a work team responsible for a particular operation (set of routines) 
who observes that a machine is not working properly. He routinely calls the maintenance 
department, which in turn routinely sends out a machine repairman. The machine repairman 
has been trained to diagnose in a particular way the troubles that such a machine might have. 
He goes down a list of possible problems systematically, and finds one that fits the 
symptoms. He fixes the part so that the machine again plays its role in the overall work 
routine. He may also, however, report to the foreman that this particular kind of trouble has 
become very common since the supplier started using aluminum in making the part in 
question and that perhaps the machine should be operated in a different manner to avoid the 
difficulty.” The authors suggest, “the responses described fall into the typical pattern in 
which a crisis or ‘exception’ condition in one part of the organization is part of the routine 
content of jobs of other personnel” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p.130). 
In FlexSite, we have an exemplification of how the routinisation of activity allows 
organizations to harness the occurrence of disruptions. The actors involved in the solution of 
a problem are forced to articulate knowledge through a series of organizing moves,   18
decisions, narratives and so on, which enact certain structural features of the organization 
(e.g., the division of labor, the application of problem solving procedures, the deliberate use 
of equipment and work tools).  
 
 
BlackSite: The effects of a coercive structure 
BlackSite is the only standalone telebank in the country. It started in May 1994. PrivateBank 
always wanted BlackSite to provide, on an independent basis, all kinds of services and 
products of any network and have its own customers. BlackSite was a quasi-autonomous 
structure within the PrivateBank Group, but its customers could use the ATMs or branches of 
PrivateBank. BlackSite, like FlexSite, is another business network of PrivateBank, because it 
does not have self-equity. 
As with all the new projects within PrivateBank, the design philosophy was the green 
field site. BlackSite was established as a new company and began its operations for the first 
time in a new site. Unlike FlexSire, BlackSite could already draw on positive experiences 
from other PrivateBank callcentres. 
 
Implementation of BlackSite. The goal of BlackSite was no different from any other telebank: 
to increase customer access hours to the bank. Their uniqueness lay in the status as a 
standalone telebank, a bank working only through direct channels, with a very personalized 
service, which thus avoided automatic call answering. Like FlexSite, the implementation of 
BlackSite followed the strategic guidelines of the PrivateBank group. BlackSite was an 
attempt to supra-impose the work values and religious ethics, but taken to an extreme. For 
example, control is perceived by communicators as reaching unbearable levels, and 
conformity to norms and standards was enforced. The use of IT-control measures enabled the 
setting up of surveillance imposed blindly on communicators. The impact of this surveillance 
especially has the ability to instill a profound sense of self-defeat. BlackSite is a clear 
counter-example of what the management of PrivateBank group believes as the unifying and 
overarching culture shared by every single member of the group. The perceived power 
distance is enormous, informal communications are discouraged, teamwork is non-existent, 
and communicators have no discretion in how they do their work. Hence, this can question 
the management credo of a consensual and homogeneous culture.   19
The major difference between FlexSite and BlackSite was that an external multi-
national consulting company managed the BlackSite project from the start. None of the 
workers were aware of the different phases of the implementation of BlackSite. Most of the 
team in charge of implementing BlackSite belonged to the consulting firm. 
This perception by people inside the communication area has its roots in the 
implementation process. None of the communicators had access to the three configurational 
processes (customer, technology and work). For example, for most people the technology 
involved in BlackSite was perceived as a ‘turnkey solution’. Only the technicians 
acknowledged that there were alternatives, more accurate paths to be followed, namely in the 
development of TCS. Thus, the workers at BlackSite did not have the possibility of 
borrowing the knowledge required to operate the technology, because they did not have the 
chance to legitimately participate in that social practice. Moreover, a strong competitive 
environment based on highly individualized job design existed, and informal 
communications were very restricted. These aspects were reinforced on all fronts: 
•  The implementation of a ‘unopenable’ black-box. 
•  The copy of UK’s First Direct mixed with the modes of working and 
organizing that pre-exist at the group PrivateBank branch level. 
•  The implementation of a technology, developed for FlexSite, imposed a 
contested formative context on the existing supra-imposed one. 
•  The high level of standardization of the tasks, to the extent that 
communicators had no discretion in how they do their job. 
•  The ‘octopus’ of control that spread its tentacles all over the place, from IT-
based control (which monitored performance and output and the wallboard of 
stacked calls) to the direct normative control of supervision (even the creation 
of an additional supervision level to reinforce this latter type of control). 
•  The work levels were imposed by manager outside the communication area, 
who, due to lack of knowledge about the workflow inside the communication 
area, set unachievable goals. 
 
All these aspects prevented social interaction among actors inside the communication 
area. The identity process around the task did not take place, communities did not develop, 
and only individual forms of resistance took place in response to the deep self-defeating   20
feeling. Participation was crucially affected by the social structure and power relations that 
shape possibilities of learning.  
The transparency of the socio-political organization of practice, of its content and of 
the technology engaged in practice, was a crucial resource for increasing participation. At 
BlackSite, this transparency was absent because of values favoring control and the 
maintenance of a system, the implication is that collective learning is inhibited. Only 
individually could communicators find their own way of coping with the gaze of the ‘big 
brother’. 
 
BlackSite in Action. The customer call triggers the dynamics inside the BlackSite 
communication area. The customer assistant relates first to the customer, and in case of 
doubt, they contact either the supervisor or assistant supervisor. In an unproblematic phone 
call, the procedures are the same as in FlexSite. In the case of a problematic call, assistants 
stand up in the callcentre and call the supervisor while the customer is kept on hold. 
Whenever there is a technical problem they ask for the technicians’ help via the supervisor. 
Thus, the standard procedures suggest the following 'moves' (Pentland, 1992): 
•  Keep the customer on hold, stand up while waiting for the supervisor or assistant 
supervisor. 
•  Look for a solution with the help of a supervisor or assistant supervisor. 
•  If the problem persists, either the supervisor or assistant supervisor searches for a 
solution in the back office. 
•  The customer assistant notes the name and contact number of the client. 
•  People from the back office call the customer back in order to solve the problem. 
•  If the system is down, wait for the technician and ask the customer to call back 
later. 
 
In the case of a problematic call, the customer assistant is but a transparent filter 
between the customers and BlackSite. Not only do they not solve any problems, but also they 
do not get back to the customer. The supervisor’s (or assistant supervisor’s) role is as a first 
order problem-solver together with customer assistant and the link between the 
communication area with the back office, where they are supposed to reach a joint solution. 
Back office is the decision center of the communication area and a depository for records of 
all transactions.   21
Tasks were, in most cases, strictly individual and communication among co-workers 
was discouraged. Two aspects of the work constrained co-workers’ relations while working: 
the standardization of the tasks and information capacity of IT to regulate and circumscribe 
communicators behavior, whereby communicators were evaluated according to how much 
time they spend on the phone. This meant little time available for communicating among co-
workers, with an associated high chance of decreasing the quality of work. 
The customer assistants were aware that their own output and performance were being 
monitored electronically. They were also confronted with prominent digital wallboard 
displays, making highly visible the number of stacked calls waiting to be answered. It might 
be difficult for the assistant to speed up, yet s/he is conscious that the current call must be 
terminated promptly, in order to take the next one.  
 
"We are cannon powder!" (BlackSite Customer assistant) 
 
"People here live with control in their heads!" (BlackSite Technician) 
 
Learning-by-doing or from co-workers was not encouraged. Assistants mainly depend 
on their supervisors for learning. Communicators always felt under pressure and were 
constantly aware that the completion of one task is immediately followed by another, ‘they 
have an assembly line in the head’ (Taylor and Bain, 1998, p. 10). Some customer assistants 
tried to circumvent what they perceive as unbearable control levels. Hence, they developed 
non-canonical (Brown and Duguid, 1991) resistance routines to deal with the perceived 
inadequacies of formal ones. It was, in a sense, a last resort in an almost unbearable situation. 
A number of interviewees reported being able, albeit to a limited extent, to disengage from 
the waiting queue calls and we also observed the practice of individuals giving the 
impression of being engaged on a telephone call when, in fact, no interaction was taking 
place. There are blind spots in the gaze of the electronic eye which could enable individuals 
to resist the rationalizing forces of surveillance (Sewell, 1998). This meaningful opposition 
was a widespread form of behavior and practices at BlackSite. 
Assistant communicators were subject to continuous normative pressure to behave 
appropriately and were constantly monitored to that effect. IT-generated information was the 
basis for control complements by direct control imposed by the supervisors. Some output 
measures were also used for financial products selling campaigns. It was very hard for   22
assistants to escape the continuous gaze of supervisors and managers (Taylor, 1998). 
Supervisors were always trying to improve performance based on the measures and criteria 
considered adequate. Furthermore, customer assistants viewed call monitoring very 
negatively. The direct supervision was not only highly obtrusive but also highly visible. 
Communities-of-coping were not formed because of the pervasive role of control, namely 
direct supervision, and the lack of support for informal interaction among communicators. 
While the technology allowed extensive monitoring it did not spell the end of human 
supervision. That was why the additional level of supervision was created. Assistants’ 
performance reports still needed to be interpreted by managers external to the communication 
area. The role of human supervision was equally obvious for the assessment of taped 
conversations. No electronic machine could summon the assistant to a coaching session to 
point out the deficiencies of their communication with the customer. Interdependence 
between customer assistants was low, and supervisor-customer assistant relations were 
hierarchical. Thus, the teams should be called workgroups instead. Teamwork involves, at 
the very least, verbal interaction between team members, which was denied both by the 
organization of work and the supervisors. An assistant dealt with a continuous flow of calls 
and divided from fellow assistants by a partition was separated both physically and audibly 
from the rest of the group members. There was a clear top-down process for relying on 
information. Hence, working in a team did not mean working together. Teams, indeed, 
fostered supervisor-led learning and in the process mitigate this otherwise hierarchical 
experience. These constraints meant that team working was, in terms of its management 
objectives, aimed more at aggregating individual levels of output and attempting to create a 
sense of collective identity in an organization of work that was inherently individualizing 
(Kinnie, Hutchinson and Purcell, 1999). 
There was low learning interdependency among communicators and the back office. 
They had very high task interdependency, combined with functional division of labor. The 
back office assumed a central place at BlackSite; they did not merely receive the unsolved 
problems from the communication area, but also had to crosscheck and validate all the 
“solved” problems. Thus, communication workers were depended on back office personnel 
to approve their work. The relations between communication area and back office were quite 
tense, despite the fact that there was very little direct interaction among adjacent workers, 
since supervisors and managers mediated relations with communication workers and the 
back office.    23
 
  
DISCUSSION 
In this section we will start by presenting the main conclusions from each case separately and 
then compare what the sites had to tell us and draw the main conclusions. 
 
FlexSite. Despite PrivateBank’s strong traditional culture of control and efficiency, FlexSite 
was a green field and a pioneering experience, a sort of organizational terra incognita. 
Therefore, only the objectives were established in a top-down manner. The design concept 
was neither highly structured nor planned and this allowed for a highly participating 
enterprise, which gave room for improvisation. This loosely-structured design concept and 
guidelines took the position of a minimal structure, because they circumscribed the set of 
controls employed to accomplish effectiveness, for which improvisation has been touted 
(Weick, 1998; Orlikowski, 1996). 
From the outset, these implementations are more likely to win the support of those who 
will use the technology and to reflect problems that participants perceive as real and pressing. 
The cornerstone of this approach was broad participation by those who would be 
affected by the technology.  They did not wait to act until they had the perfectly conceived 
plan; instead, they create an always temporary plan by acting. 
An experimental culture resulted from a set of values and beliefs that promote action 
and experimentation as a way of facing reality. They had peripherally been exposed to the 
actual practice. However, it was only when they were granted the legitimacy of being treated 
as project team members that they had full access to practice. They were able to engage with 
the technology, participating in social relations and all other activities. The internal part of 
the team were under the influence of a formative context (Unger, 1986), which accounted for 
their skills and the lack of awareness of their actual practice. This formative context 
constituted the background condition for their actions, enforcing constraints, giving direction 
and meaning, and setting the range of opportunities for undertaking action. There was tension 
between a deep-seated formative context which was conducive to formalizing and defining 
rules, roles and tasks, and the action of this community-of-practice, that was unfolding and 
developing simultaneously with the progressive institutionalization of work practices and 
routines. However, the outcome of the formative context was a transparent, taken-for-granted 
neutral technology for the communicators who daily execute the routines with TCS.   24
This resulted in a smooth process of identity building that evolved into a community-
of-practice around their tasks and its constant need for redesign. 
Clearly there was a struggle between an invisible, conservative, formative context 
which wanted to remain the same and the visible, ephemeral routines, between dynamic 
stability and unwillingness to change, between ‘transient constructs’ and more permanent 
ones (Lanzara, 1999). It was the flexible nature of the workforce, resulting from LPP, that 
allows this dynamic balance, and kept FlexSite going, and it was an important space for the 
creation of new practices and routines that alter the formative context. 
In FlexSite, there was a held belief that a great plan could only be accomplished by 
finding an emerging pattern in actions taken in the past through sensemaking (Weick, 1995). 
The implementation of TCS, in turn, affects the formative context inasmuch as tacit 
knowledge became embedded in TCS, therefore the boundary shifted between what was 
tacitly held as background knowledge and what they were aware of as situational knowledge. 
‘Design is a process of sensemaking that makes do with whatever materials are at 
hand’ (Weick, 1993, p.351). The organizing process of implementation of FlexSite was, from 
the start, an ongoing process of designing and sensemaking (Ciborra, 1999), where 
improvisational learning played a major role as an embryo to set routines. The design of 
FlexSite was a function of the negotiated actions and interpretations of some of its members 
and was in a constant activity of change. Improvising means using the resources at hand 
(material, social and/or cognitive) while action unfolds and organizing takes place. It is the 
capacity to create resources from the residues of past experience that guides the design. 
Building from scratch might require improvisation, because improvisation has the ability to 
serve as a transmitter of tacit knowledge and also because there is a lot of sensemaking 
activity going along all the non-routine situations. 
One could argue that the construction of FlexSite from scratch rested upon the high-
institutionalized know-how of PrivateBank. However, a large amount of new knowledge or 
re-combinations of existing knowledge were also needed, so the project team was composed 
in a way that a pool of different types of knowledge could be combined.  
The actor must make sense of a situation that makes do with whatever materials are at 
hand (Weick, 1993). ‘Such constructions [bricolage, reflective practice and situated practice] 
are part of learning, additions to the bricoleur’s set, and will be revisited in retrospection or 
when attempting to analyze new problems’ (Orr, 1996, p.12). For Schön (1983) notions of 
knowing in action and reflecting in action are essential for bricolage to occur, since it   25
requires the enactment of items from the context. The bricoleur is a pure agent of structure 
(Weick, 1999). 
The first group of communicators became important. For them it was a formative 
experience whereby they molded their ‘own telebanking’. This promoted in them the 
development of a sense of belonging to a community of pioneers. In stabilizing FlexSite, 
participation legitimately crept in from the periphery as a function of their developed, 
negotiated understanding and identity, under the influence of the formative context. Their 
legitimacy was an important function of the social relations between different hierarchical 
levels inside FlexSite. The community-of-practice acted as a locally negotiated regime of 
competence. Its members were connected by their tasks and by socially constructed webs of 
beliefs. This community was the locus for understanding social practice inside FlexSite. 
Legitimate Peripheral Participation was the pattern for socializing newcomers into 
FlexSite. The extra-functional skills requested from any newcomer are like an ID, which will 
give him/her the legitimacy to enter the participation ladder. This starts with induction 
program in teams with various backgrounds. This primordial community-of-practice 
developed locally their idiosyncratic language. Both Orr (1990) and Lave and Wenger (1991) 
understand improvisation as a sense-making process of the incoming events and the 
development of ad hoc solutions within the community-of-practice and consist of non-
canonical routines. The main purpose is to create a uniform knowledge base, but this can 
generate some conflicts and episodes of negotiation, shaping each other’s experience of 
meaning, which in turn might increase their shared knowledge base. The original nucleus had 
situational, procedural and declarative situational knowledge. What they lacked was 
theoretical knowledge of different areas. They recruited the new group ‘college boys’ who 
had explicit, formal, theoretical knowledge- who on the one hand could enlarge FlexSite 
stock of knowledge, and on the other hand, their lack of experience made them a highly 
manipulable group. However, this was not necessarily a conscious process. The first group of 
communicators was perceived by this second group as having the competence and experience 
that they lacked. Both groups start their process of constructing or reconstructing their 
identity. This happened from the training onwards. 
Learning took place especially through modified forms of participation that were 
structured to open the practice to these yet non-members. Peripherality provided an 
approximation of full participation that gives exposure to actual practice. With observation as 
a means of precluding actual engagement, special assistance by experienced communicators   26
and the exchange of stories that are part of practice and take place within it. This type of 
participation provided them access to the three dimensions of practice: mutual engagement 
with other members, their actions and their negotiation of the enterprise, and to their 
repertoire-in-use. This provided them with a sense of how their community operated and, at 
the same time, granted them enough legitimacy to be treated as potential members. 
These communicators became included in the community-of-practice, which was a 
high involvement system. This initial community-of-practice was the backbone of FlexSite. 
It was the key to successful situational on-the-job and improvisational learning. They were 
the ones who progressively, and largely, by trial and error or by discovery, organized work 
inside FlexSite.  
Despite the direct supervision, standardization and indirect controls coordinated via 
PrivateBank’s culture, improvisation took place. The touchstone of controlling improvisers 
lies not so much in the degree of obtrusiveness of those mechanisms, but in their invisibility. 
In what concerned direct supervision, the facilitative supervision assumed by FlexSite 
supervisors allowed this type of co-ordination without hampering creativity (Sewell, 1998). 
Second order controls were rendered invisible not only because they were incorporated in the 
‘production’ technology, but because very little relevance was given to performance data: 
because they were already working at full capacity. 
The community-of-practice still profited from the work enrichment policies of 
PrivateBank, namely flexibility and rotation. The emphasis on the flexibility of the work 
force and the rotation policy, and at the same time the stability of PrivateBank as a whole, 
allowed this community to improvise. Because of these policies, they were able to develop a 
good pool of resources from which to draw when a decision or problematic situation arose. 
They improvised concerning recruitment policies, organization of work and job design inside 
FlexSite. Hence, FlexSite is a product of the accumulated negotiated actions, bricolage and 
improvisation that occurred while developing, and new solutions were needed to face 
problematic situations. These policies, training programs and system designs were often at 
odds with the reality of their work. We found that it was the collective construction of a local 
practice that, among other things, made it possible to meet the demands of the institution. 
Although communicators’ work may appear individually designed, and though their jobs are 
primarily defined and organized individually, communicators become important to each 
other. They were quite aware of their interdependence in making the job possible and the 
pleasant atmosphere.    27
Lave (1988) argued that everyday, routine activities are especially appropriate topics 
for practice theory. The calls and all the moves inside FlexSite were interesting from the 
organizational point of view because they invoke and enact the major structural features of 
the organization. The stabilization of FlexSite owed a lot to improvisation because that was 
one important process through which knowledge was transmitted and meanings were ‘rented’ 
by individuals (Holquist, 1983). Through these processes, minimal structure was enacted. 
 
BlackSite.  The black box that constituted BlackSite was impossible to open. The 
implementation of BlackSite, from structure to organization of work, to constitution of the 
workforce was carried by the consulting company, with the Board of Directors only 
establishing the goals and guidelines. The latter wanted TB to be a highly competitive bank. 
This in turn was converted into an internal, competitive environment. Moreover, some 
technicians participated in the adaptation of TCS, but their participation was restricted to 
minor developments, once it was assumed that the developments done for FlexSite were 
enough. Hence, some of the formative context of FlexSite was imposed on BlackSite by 
means of the technology. 
BlackSite was black-boxed for its users. As opposed to FlexSite, BlackSite was 
physically isolated from any of PrivateBank’s companies and the lack of perceived 
technological and job content changes reinforced this idea of a black box.  
BlackSite faced a number of challenges almost from day one. These included: 
considerable IT problems, an inexperienced management team (which was mostly from the 
PrivateBank branch network) and centrally determined human resources policies and 
procedures which were inadequate to the particularities of telebanking. The various groups of 
employees, who were at least slightly aware of the outcome of the implementation process, 
blamed the consulting company for having devised an over-ambitious project, trying to 
imitate UK’s First Direct, without acknowledging the specificity of the market. 
The structure of BlackSite being similar to other organizations from the group was a 
clear sign of the pre-institutional stage BlackSite was in (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). The way 
the BlackSite project was designed and implemented lead to a poor understanding of the 
technology, very ambiguous goals and the environment itself created symbolic uncertainties. 
Thus, BlackSite modeled itself on the PrivateBank branch network that had already proven 
its success. This was accomplished by imitation or by what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
refer to as mimetic mechanism of institutional isomorphic change. Although, BlackSite was a   28
green field site designed ‘all at once’, it was actually the outcome of two institutional 
isomorphic changes. The first one was imitation-by-design held by the consulting company, 
the second results from the first by generating uncertainty. BlackSite ended up by imitating 
established practices existing in the bank branches from which they were more closely 
dependent. Thus, it was little wonder that the structure of BlackSite, a standalone bank, was 
the same as in the branches of the group. It was again the power of the formative context 
imposing the rules of the coercive organizational structure and design and the corresponding 
ways of not sharing information in the context of use. 
The concept of the stand-alone bank was understood as independent from any 
PrivateBank structures, and this remains something of a paradox. On the one hand, BlackSite 
depended on PrivateBank information systems but they did not use the support and stock of 
knowledge already available. Moreover, while they previously had good experiences, such as 
FlexSite, to draw on (which is closer in terms of the knowledge and expertise required), the 
green field design concept together with the idea of an independent bank led PrivateBank to 
hire the consulting firm. As a result, the branch structure was copied and people from within 
the group were selected which, taken to the extreme, can question the design concept. 
BlackSite was a multi-layer sedimentation of incompatible formative contexts (that is, 
PrivateBank culture and FlexSite). These contexts were incompatible because there was no 
room for its enactment in action, and therefore, sensemaking processes were very hard to 
take place and/or to attach meanings to their work or to the technology. The lid of black box 
could not be open, hence technology and work never gain interpretative flexibility. As a 
consequence, there were not only material limits to interpretative flexibility but also 
cognitive hurdles. 
The stability of BlackSite  depended on the black boxing of the whole enterprise 
supported by high levels of control and the development of non-canonical coping strategies 
to circumvent the perceived inadequacies of the formal routines. 
 
CONCLUSION 
At a first glance, we would be led to the belief that in both sites the minimal structure 
philosophy of structuring had been adopted. The espoused green field implementation 
strategy, together with the loosely structured guidelines emanated from PrivateBank board of 
directors could easily match the definition and all the benefits of minimal structuring. 
However, we need to delve simultaneously into both their definition and into what the sites   29
had to tell us. In order to achieve this endeavor we revisited the cases and then got back to 
the characteristics of minimal structures. In FlexSite, the green field philosophy together with 
the fact that it was a pilot site in the country, created among its members the need to keep 
some processes under control (structural constraint) and due to the low degree of 
institutionalized knowledge, it created the conditions for the enactment of unforeseen 
structures (opportunity structure). To find the balance between these opposite forces and to 
face the underlying formative context, FlexSite members' had to rely on each other to make 
sense of their work setting. Therefore, they engaged with each other, negotiated and created a 
mutual repertoire and placed themselves on an inbound trajectory. A strong community-of-
practice was created that allowed them to actually enact the minimal structures and a highly 
involvement system. Various types of learning were encouraged, including trial-and-error 
and improvisation. 
At BlackSite, there were only structural constraints. Here, people felt they were 
compelled to follow the supra-imposed guidelines and conform to the rules. Control was 
perceived as reaching unbearable levels. The impact of IT surveillance especially impregnate 
a profound sense of self-defeat. There were no zones of manoeuvre to engage with fellow 
coworkers. There was no shared identity, which compromised situational learning to develop 
and any but imposed self-contained structures to play their part. As we have said before, the 
pre-existing formative context exerts a major role upon the form and course that the 
development of communities-of-practice. It can enable them or hinder any sort of social 
identity to take place.  
Despite the study’s limitations, which include the limited number of cases, lack of 
developmental focus and lack of a wider systematic context within which the technology 
under scrutiny is operating and the difficulties of analytic generalization. Several 
observations from our cases should be considered in future research. This study allows 
testing the concept of minimal structures in an empirical, dynamic way. Thus, going back to 
Kamoche and Cunha’s (2001) definition and confronting it with our cases, it seems that we 
should read between the lines. “co-ordination devices that attempt to focus the activities of 
people around a common set of goals and deadlines without limiting their discretion to best 
decide how to reach these goals". The first part of the definition is what the consulting 
company tried to do at BlackSite. The implementation of minimal structures should then 
consider the way people actually enact the co-ordination devices. In Blacksite, they enacted 
co-ordination structures as unbearable control structures, where employees' discretion was   30
non-existent.  What the cases seem to tell us is that, to take more out of the minimal structure 
philosophy, several requirements should be considered. A strongly shared identity, in 
particular, emerged as increasing the chances for communities-of-practice to flourish and the 
various types of situational and improvisational learning to take place. Minimal structures 
seem to be enacted in practice through recurrent interaction with the technology at hand. It is 
precisely interaction what makes the community-of-practice perceive those structures as 
enabling. 
The theory of organizational learning can greatly benefit from the development of a theory of 
organizational improvisation, or vice-versa. The fluidity and interpenetration of identity, 
learning and improvisation makes it increasingly difficult to 'know the dancer from the dance' 
(W.B. Yeats, Among School Children VIII). 
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